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An Internalization Approach to Joint Ventures: The Case of 
Coca-Cola in China 
 




In the presence of high transaction costs due to market imperfections, it is normally less 
expensive for multinational corporations (MNCs) to conduct their business activities in 
new markets through their internal corporate structures rather than by relying on the 
markets. Based on a case study of Coca-Cola’s entry into the Chinese market, this paper 
tests the applicability of internalization theory to explaining the entry mode choices of 
MNCs in developing countries. Internalization theory reveals the economic rationale that 
was behind the changes in Coca-Cola’s modes of entry as it moved from franchising to 
joint ventures (JVs) with selected local partners, and more recently to the combination of 
JVs and franchising.  
 




When a multinational corporation (MNC) enters into new markets, it is rather costly for it 
to conduct business activities in imperfect markets due to high transaction costs. These 
costs include those accruing from the problems of opportunism, small numbers of market 
agents, uncertainty, and bounded rationality, as outlined by Williamson (1975). He 
argued that the transaction costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts via the 
market are greater than the costs of internalizing the market. The situation is further 
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worsened when the business transactions involve complex contractual contingencies. As 
such, it appears that an MNC will prefer to establish wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) 
to deal with market imperfections. Apart from the choice of WOSs, there are also other 
commonly used modes, such as joint ventures (JVs). Based on a case study of Coca-Cola 
in China, this paper tests the applicability of the internalization theory to explain the entry 
mode choice of MNCs in developing countries. 
Coca-Cola in China has been chosen as a case study for a number of reasons. 
First, Coca-Cola is the world’s largest cola producer and one of the biggest MNCs. 
Second, Coca-Cola has a relatively long history of investment in China since 1979, when 
economic reform was implemented under the de facto leadership of Deng Xiaoping.1 
Third, faced with keen competition from its close competitor, Pepsi-Cola, and an 
unfamiliar and highly versatile local market environment, Coca-Cola’s ability, experience 
and success in capturing a large market share in China seem to constitute an interesting 
case, upon which implications may be drawn for the understanding of MNCs’ market 
entry into developing countries via establishing equity joint ventures (EJVs). Fourth, 
there are only two previous studies on the operation of Coca-Cola in China: Nolan (1995) 
and PU-TU-USC (2000). Based on a case study of the Coca-Cola bottling plant in 
Tianjin, Nolan (1995) conducted the first in-depth analysis of the micro-economic impact 
of a single Coca-Cola plant in China. He found that the Coca-Cola business system in 
general has positive impacts on the development of labour, capital and product markets in 
China. The findings of Nolan (1995) are in-line with the conclusion of the large-scale 
study conducted by a team of economists at Peking University, Tsinghua University and 
the University of South Carolina (PU-TU-USC, 2000). Based on an input-output model, 
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they estimate that the economic multiplier effects of Coca-Cola’s capital investment and 
ongoing operation [including the upstream (suppliers) and downstream (distribution) 
business linkages in the Coca-Cola business system] in China generated a total of about 
414,000 jobs, 21.7 billion yuan of output and 1.2 billion yuan of tax payment in 1998 
(PU-TU-USC, 2000: ii-iii).  
Despite the valuable information provided by the above meticulous studies, there 
is no specific literature providing the theoretical foundation for the entry mode choice of 
Coca-Cola in China. To fill this gap, this paper tests the applicability of the 
internalization theory in explaining the entry mode choice of Coca-Cola in China since 
1979. The contributions of our paper not only produce implications for the applicability 
of the internalization theory, but also provide an insight into the market expansion 
strategy of a global soft drink manufacturer in China. It must be emphasized that other 
relevant impacts of the Coca-Cola businesses, such as the economic impacts of the Coca-
Cola business system in China, are not the focus and thus will not be discussed in this 
paper.  
METHODOLOGY 
Internalization theory is used as a conceptual framework to analyse Coca-Cola’s evolving 
modes of entry into the Chinese market. The framework helps to explain why JVs are the 
company’s favoured choice of economic structure. This theoretical approach is 
complemented by empirical research that was conducted in China. The principal author 
made two research trips to China between November 1999 and March 2000. In addition 
to general data collection, face-to-face interviews were carried out with high-level 
management staff members of Coca-Cola. The General Manager of the Department of 
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Operations, and the Director of Marketing of Coca-Cola’s head office in Beijing were 
interviewed in November 1999, and the Deputy General Manager of Coca-Cola’s bottling 
plant in Tianjin was interviewed in March 2000.2 Prior to the field visits, questions were 
sent to interviewees at Coca-Cola’s head office in Beijing. For further details of the 
questions that were posed and other related information, see Appendix A. 
Apart from discussing Coca-Cola’s expansion in China since 1979, the interviews 
focused on the qualitative aspects of the company’s business operations, in particular its 
relationship with local partners. Only rarely was this type of information obtainable from 
any other publicly available sources. To facilitate conversation in a friendly environment, 
all of the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured and informal manner. Chinese 
government officials were not present. Whilst each interview had a specific focus, open-
ended questions were posed, and the interviewees were encouraged to guide the 
conversation as the situation allowed.3 
Furthermore, throughout the process of research the principal author maintained 
close personal contact with Coca-Cola’s regional office in Hong Kong, which was a 
reliable source of general and up-to-date information about the company’s presence, 
operations and management in Southeast Asia. 
In the following sections we discuss the key arguments that concern the entry 
mode choices of MNCs, and examine the economic rationale and conditions that allow 
JVs to be more efficient than WOSs. The discussion then extends to a brief review of the 
development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China since the late 1970s, which is a 
process that is relevant to Coca-Cola’s entry into the Chinese market. This is followed by 
an analysis of Coca-Cola’s business strategy of internalizing the Chinese market since 
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1979. Finally, implications are drawn about Coca-Cola’s experiences with reference to 
the market entry strategies of other MNCs. 
 
THE ENTRY MODE CHOICES OF MNCs 
Transaction costs are increasingly important for MNCs in the selection of host countries 
for FDI (Sara and Newhouse, 1995). According to Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985) and 
Hennart (1982, 1991), internalization theory proposes that in the event of high transaction 
costs which are caused by market imperfections, it is normally less expensive for an 
MNC to use its internal corporate structure to conduct business transactions rather than 
by relying on the market (McManus, 1972; Dunning, 1981). Imperfections may be the 
result of uncertainty in the market, the small number of agents that are available, 
opportunism or bounded rationality (Williamson, 1975; Buckley, 1992).  
 The internalization approach further suggests that a rational profit-maximizing 
MNC would tend to establish a WOS, either in the form of greenfield investment or the 
acquisition of another firm in the host country. However, there are other modes that 
MNCs can adopt to deal with market imperfections, viz. joint ventures.4 It is crucial to 
identify the economic rationale behind the theory that the establishment of JVs may 
generate more efficiency gains than the establishment of WOSs for MNCs in the host 
country (Beamish, 1988: 96-101; Luo, 1998: 145-148). 
According to Teece (1983), the basic argument for the attractiveness of JVs over 
WOSs is the potential for reaping revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing benefits. Lacking 
nation-specific knowledge of the host country, such as the nature of the local market 
(including its culture, business practices, contacts, etc.) and the local government, it could 
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be costly for an MNC to engage in business transactions involving writing, executing, 
and enforcing complex contracts with market intermediaries (Beamish, 1988; Meyer, 
1998: 87-113). However, the usual attractiveness of an MNC is its possession of a rent-
yielding asset. When an MNC’s rent-yielding asset is combined with the assets of its 
local partners, the synergistic effect may produce more rents to offset the costs of 
forming JVs. The revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing potential in JVs may outweigh 
the advantages of WOSs (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart, 1991). 
In the context of the transaction cost paradigm, an obvious question comes to 
mind: why and under what conditions are JVs a better solution than WOSs to the 
problems of opportunism, small numbers of market agents, uncertainty and bounded 
rationality? Some of the literature has touched upon this question, e.g. Buckley and 
Casson (1985), Beamish (1988) and Hennart (1991). 
Opportunism: Williamson (1975) argues that the problems of opportunism while not 
uncommon, are not necessarily inevitable. Beamish (1988: 98) suggests that JVs can 
mitigate the problem of opportunism via mutual trust and forbearance. Based on mutual 
trust, both an MNC and its local partners would be more willing to tolerate their 
relationship in order to ensure the long-term viability of their JV. Relying on the 
managerial talent of the JV that may accrue from mutual trust may be a more efficient 
way of dealing with opportunism than relying on explicit legal efforts to complete all 
contingencies. Moreover, Casson (1990) explains that a high degree of trust between 
agents could promote economic performance. Berg and Friedman (1980) suggest that 
when there are reasonable mechanisms for profit division, joint decision-making and 
monitoring, both the MNC and its local partners would have less incentive to behave 
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opportunistically. Insofar as the mechanism for profit division is determined in an open 
manner and is accepted by all parties of the JV, they may be willing to aim for the same 
goal of long-term profit maximization. Consequently, the problem of opportunism may 
be mitigated. 
Small numbers of market agents: Small numbers of market agents can be an acute 
problem when an MNC wishes to seek a new venture partner in the host country. Since 
the initial local partner has cost advantage over other local market agents, it is thus not 
always optimal for the MNC to switch its partners. If the above-mentioned mechanisms 
for profit division, joint decision-making and monitoring are well-developed enough to 
sustain the viability of a long-term commitment of joint maximization of profits, there 
will be less incentive for both parties of the JV to switch partners (Contractor, 1985). 
Uncertainty: With the presence of uncertainty in the market environment, there is an 
incentive for an MNC to form a JV in order to economize on the information 
requirements for FDI (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998: 491-506). This objective can be 
achieved by pooling the resources of the MNC and its local partners (Caves, 1982). The 
competitive advantages of an MNC are its firm-specific knowledge in terms of 
technology, management and capital markets. The competitive advantages of its local 
partners are mainly their location-specific knowledge about the local market, such as its 
culture, business practices, contacts and the local government. The synergistic effects of 
combining the resources of all parties of the JV could possibly result in a lower long-term 
average cost accruing from uncertainty than in the case of a WOS. 
Bounded rationality: In his study of human behaviour, Simon (1957) used the term 
‘bounded rationality’ to indicate that human beings have limited knowledge. In the 
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process of making a decision, the information and knowledge that are acquired by 
economic agents are limited. This in itself is one source of market imperfections. Despite 
the imperfection of human knowledge, economic structures are required to reduce 
uncertainty in the market environment (Hayek, 1945). When entering foreign markets, it 
is essential for MNCs to devise economic structures that lessen the costs of bounded 
rationality and minimize the losses from other sources of market imperfections (Sara and 
Newhouse, 1995). Beamish (1988) argues that the problem of bounded rationality also 
exists in JVs and WOSs. In fact, there is no substantial evidence to support the argument 
that this problem can be less severe in JVs than in WOSs. As an alternative mode of 
foreign market entry, JVs incur lower costs that are associated with the problems of 
opportunism, small numbers of agents and uncertainty under the conditions that are 
specified above. 
 Apart from discussing entry mode choices with reference to the transaction cost 
paradigm, some studies (e.g. Erramilli, 1996) suggest that the national culture of MNCs 
explains, to a degree, the variation in ownership levels of their FDI. However, the effect 
of the national culture on the level of equity ownership is not the focus of this paper. 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
China has been considerably successful in attracting FDI since the implementation of 
economic reform in 1979. According to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation (MOFTEC), the total utilized value of FDI reached US$385 billion till October 
2001 (Table 1). EJV has been the most popular mode for MNCs to enter the Chinese 
market during this period. The total number of EJVs reached 213,780 in October 2001, 
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accounting for 56 per cent of the total number of FDI firms in China. Together with other 
types of JVs [e.g. contractual joint ventures and joint R&D ventures], JVs owned and/or 
operated by Chinese and foreign firms accounted for 69 per cent of all firms with FDI. In 
comparison, there were 119,589 WOSs of foreign firms, which accounted for 31 per cent 
of the total number of firms with FDI. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In terms of the share in the total utilized value of FDI, EJVs accounted for 45 per 
cent, amounting to US$172 billion, during the period 1979-October 2001 (Table 1). In 
comparison, WOSs accounted for 34 per cent of total utilized value of FDI at the same 
time. This suggests that the mode of EJVs was popular in China among foreign direct 
investors. During the two decades of economic reform, the Chinese market remained a 
relatively new territory for foreign firms. In other words, China was a typical ‘imperfect 
market’ for foreign MNCs – the result of, among others, uncertainty, small numbers of 
agents, opportunism, bounded rationality and a lack of knowledge about the local market. 
To reduce the risks associated with the ‘imperfect market’, JVs in many cases could be a 
more effective mode of entry than WOSs for the MNCs. 
Coca-Cola’s decision to invest in China represents one MNC’s response to the 
growth opportunities that are available. That Coca-Cola considered different market entry 
models is indicative of the company’s efforts to produce a strategy that was capable of 
coping with the potential problems of a new and ‘imperfect’ market. The choice of entry 
modes will be the focus of the next section. 
 
COCA-COLA’S CHOICE OF ENTRY MODE IN CHINA 
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Given China’s enormous population and relatively high growth rate of real GDP (about 
nine per cent on average since 1979), the country has long been viewed as an important 
market with great potential for many of the world’s giant MNCs, including the 
carbonated cola producers Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. To achieve unprecedented market 
accessibility, Coca-Cola utilized different modes of market entry over three different 
stages of operation after 1979. A brief outline of these three stages is as follows.5  
• During the first stage (1979-84), Coca-Cola sold concentrate to its franchised 
Chinese-owned bottlers. Its local market agents were fully responsible for production 
and distribution. Market agents were opportunistic in running the bottling business 
because they wanted to focus on their bottom lines. This limited the expansion of 
Coca-Cola’s market share. 
• During the second stage (1985-92), Coca-Cola bought equity shares in the bottling 
businesses to reduce the effect of uncertainty and to restrict the opportunistic 
behaviour of its local partners. 
• During the third stage (1993-present), Coca-Cola teamed up with two foreign bottlers, 
the Kerry group and the Swire group, under a franchise agreement. Apart from 
internalizing management control, Coca-Cola also internalized procurement 
transactions and the labour section of its bottling business by localizing its 
management team and upstream suppliers. The synergistic effect appeared to be high, 
and it brought revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing benefits to the company. 
In 1992, there were about ten Coca-Cola bottling plants in the form of JVs, in 
which Coca-Cola only had minority shares. In eight years, eighteen new JVs were 
established. Coca-Cola has majority stakes (directly or indirectly) in all twenty-eight 
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bottling plants (Table 2). Among these only three plants located in Hainan, Tianjin and 
Shanghai are under the direct control of Coca-Cola. The Kerry Group and the Swire 
Group share the management of the other 25 plants. After investments of more than 
US$1 billion by the Coca-Cola system (including investments by the anchor and key 
bottlers) during the last two decades, Coca-Cola products are now available to about 80 
per cent of the Chinese population via a comprehensive network of production and 
distribution systems (relying on both in-house direct distribution and third-party 
wholesale) all over the country (PU-TU-USC, 2000: 24). In 2000, the share of Coca-Cola 
brands (including Sprite and Fanta) in China’s carbonated soft drinks market was 40 per 
cent, while that of Pepsi-Cola was only 15 per cent (Table 3) (Field survey, 1999 and 
2000; hereinafter see Appendix A for further details about the field survey).6 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
The Franchise Mode of Entry (1979-84)  
Franchise was Coca-Cola’s entry mode during this period. The bottling plants were 
exclusively wholly owned by China’s state-owned enterprises. Right after China 
launched its open door policy in 1979, Coca-Cola began a lengthy process of negotiation 
with the Chinese Government on accessing the Chinese market. The outcome of the 
negotiation was the permission for the sale of imported Coca-Cola soft drinks to 
foreigners only in China’s three ‘economic cities’, viz. Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou. Between 1980 and1984, Coca-Cola built three bottling plants in Beijing 
(1981), Guangzhou (1983) and Xiamen (1984) and then transferred all its ownership 
rights to various Chinese state-owned enterprises due to the restriction of Chinese 
government policy on the beverage sector. Foreign firms, such as Coca-Cola, were not 
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allowed to own bottling plants in China.7 In return, the Chinese-owned bottling plants 
bought concentrate imported by Coca-Cola. On receiving the concentrate imported by 
Coca-Cola, the bottling plants added syrup, water, sugar and gas (CO2) into the 
concentrate and the carbonated soft drinks were then ready for sale. Under this type of 
arrangement, Coca-Cola worked like a wholesaler, while the bottling plants were market 
agents, performing the functions of production and distribution. Furthermore, the only 
return for Coca-Cola’s investment in China during the first stage was the sale of 
concentrate to the bottling plants. The profit from this type of business activity was 
considerably limited (Field survey, 1999 and 2000). 
As all bottling plants were wholly owned by local Chinese enterprises, Coca-Cola 
had neither management rights in the operation of the plants, nor control over the volume 
of production, sales or distribution strategy, not to mention a long-term policy on 
penetration into the vast Chinese market. Being a de facto wholesaler of concentrate and 
facing uncertainty on the long-term accessibility in the Chinese market, Coca-Cola lacked 
market information or the permission by the Chinese government to expand its business 
in China. Besides, Coca-Cola faced problems of opportunism. Its market agents were 
invariably passive and merely focused on their own bottom lines (Field survey, 1999 and 
2000; Business China, 19 February 1996: 1-2). They did not have the same goal as Coca-
Cola to pursue a long-term marketing strategy for the soft drink business in China. This 
can largely be explained by the typical problem of a socialist regime in which the 
ownership rights of enterprises were not clearly defined. Claims on the residuals of 
enterprises were vague. On the operation side of the bottling business, Coca-Cola did not 
have any say on the output level. Although the local partners held the management and 
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control rights, their production behaviour was highly influenced by the operational policy 
of ‘promoting’ sales which was in turn subjected to the constraints of production targets 
(yichan dingxiao) (Field survey, 2000).8 Under this policy, production units produced a 
level of output that was based on readily available raw materials, energy supply and 
production ability. Related distributors were expected to handle and market the output. 
The distributors provided the market information to the production units, but the 
producers decided the output level according to their readily available resources. In fact, 
the producers did not necessarily adjust their production outputs according to the market 
information. Consequently, there was often a disparity between output and market 
demand.9  
Apart from the opportunistic behaviour of its market agents in China, Coca-Cola 
faced various uncertainties in the market environment, including uncertainties in the 
transport system and national wholesale networks. The transport system was at best 
primitive and antiquated, and at that time no wholesale network existed. In cities, large 
fleets of peddle-wheeled tricycles were still used to distribute soft drinks from one 
location to another. The distribution network was highly cost-ineffective and time-
consuming (Field survey, 1999; Clifford, 1993). Thus, during the first stage of its entry 
into the market, Coca-Cola targeted bottling and concentrate plants in China’s coastal 
cities, where a greater degree of economic liberalization had enhanced the consumption 
ability of consumers (AWSJ, 15 February 1994: 1).  
Faced with the above challenges, Coca-Cola’s expansion stagnated.  By 1984 
there were only three bottling plants in China (Table 2), and by 1985 the company’s 
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market share was less than two per cent (Advertising Age, 9 June 1986: 56). Such 
constraints greatly hindered the long-term objectives of Coca-Cola’s FDI in China.  
 
The Joint Venture Mode of Entry (1985-92) 
In order to penetrate the Chinese market, Coca-Cola prepared to internalize its market 
transactions by acquiring the management rights to the bottling plants through the 
establishment of JVs.10 With its liberalization policy to attract FDI in the mid-1980s, 
China permitted Coca-Cola’s bottling partner in Macau and a local enterprise in Zhuhai 
to form the first JV bottling plant in 1985. In order to handle the uncertainty on market 
expansion and to mitigate the constraints compounded by the opportunistic behaviour of 
its local partners, Coca-Cola started to actively involve in the operation of the bottling 
plants by entering into JV arrangements with local partners. This marked the beginning of 
the second stage of mode of entry in China (Field survey, 2000). 
In 1986, Coca-Cola was allowed to build a concentrate plant in Shanghai in the 
form of WOS. To keep concentrate plants in the form of WOSs was, and still is, Coca-
Cola’s strategy to safeguard the formula of producing its concentrate.11 In return for the 
permission to run the concentrate plant on sole-proprietorship, Coca-Cola let its Chinese 
partners hold the ownership of the bottling plant, which was jointly built near the 
concentrate plant in Shanghai. Coca-Cola entered a 50-50 JV with the former Ministry of 
Light Industry (now called the State Light Industry Bureau, reporting to the State 
Economic and Trade Commission) and the Shanghai Investment and Trust Company to 
establish the Shanghai Shenmei Beverage Co. Ltd. in 1986 (Field survey, 2000). The 
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business relationship between Coca-Cola’s concentrate plants in Shanghai and its local 
partners is delineated in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Meantime, the Chinese Government actually still maintained tight control over 
the development of soft drink industry in China with an aim to nurture local Chinese 
brands. This was mostly due to the shortage of fund for local soft drink makers to catch 
up with foreign soft drink makers, notably as Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola (South China 
Morning Post (SCMP), 8 June 1996: 6). Coca-Cola might have had limited knowledge 
about the paternalistic attitude of the Chinese Government to protect its local brands. This 
was a problem of bounded rationality faced by foreign firms (Field survey, 2000). 
However, with its liberalization policy to attract FDI and partly due to the opening up of 
the beverage market in China since the mid-1980s, foreign soft drink makers such as 
Coca-Cola were allowed to jointly own bottling plants with local partners but at minority 
shares (Table 4). The number of Coca-Cola’s bottling plants had increased rapidly from 
four in 1985 to ten in 1992 (Table 2). A decade after re-entering the Chinese market, 
Coca-Cola’s business in China started to become profitable in 1990 (PU-TU-USC, 2000: 
15). Coca-Cola’s strategy was to acquire management rights of its JVs regardless of the 
amount of its shares in the plants. The main objective was to exert control over the 
bottling operations, otherwise, the opportunistic behaviour of the market agents would 
seriously hamper the growth of Coca-Cola business in China. For example, Coca-Cola 
only acquired 25 per cent of shares in its JV bottling plant in Hainan, yet its local partners 
focused on retaining a controlling block of shares. By surrendering their management 
rights to their Western partners, the local partners could earn decent profits by off-loading 
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part of their shares in bottling plants. In addition, the local partners hoped to learn the 
management expertise of western MNCs. On acquiring management rights, Coca-Cola 
had the authority to appoint general managers to consolidate the production and 
marketing of its products in China (Field survey, 1999).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 During the second stage, when the entry mode was JVs, Coca-Cola faced several 
constraints to further expand its business in China. Some of them were basically the same 
as those in the first stage. The behaviour of its local partners was opportunistic, in that 
they still wanted to focus on their own bottom lines rather than the maximization of 
Coca-Cola’s market share in China. More importantly, the local partners did not have a 
strong grasp of the concept of marketing and market share. The operational policy of 
yichan dingxiao highly constrained the growth potential of the JVs in the carbonated soft 
drinks market. Another serious difficulty faced by Coca-Cola was its limited knowledge 
(i.e. bounded rationality) to fully appreciate the financial difficulties that were faced by 
its local partners for a long-term expansion strategy of their JV businesses. This was 
largely because Coca-Cola’s partners were partially owned by local governments or 
various ministries. They were too poor to finance the JV expansion (Field survey, 1999 
and 2000).12 Furthermore, any major decisions about additional investment from the JV 
partners had to be approved by the corresponding governments or bureaux. The 
transaction costs that were involved in cutting through local government red tape were 
very high. Besides, Coca-Cola was constrained by the rigidities in the labour market and 
the lack of experienced managerial staff with whom to oversee new plants. As a result, 
the company’s market share increased only slightly during the second stage of its entry. 
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Between 1992 and 1993, when local soft drink producers controlled up to 70 per cent of 
the market, Coca-Cola’s market share stagnated at 12 per cent (Table 3). 
A Hybrid Mode of Entry (1993-Present) 
To reduce the impact of the above problems, Coca-Cola internalized the market 
transactions through its strategy of long-term investments combined with its control of 
production and the domestic distribution channel. In addition, the company also 
internalized the procurement transactions and labour market of its bottling business by 
localising its management team and upstream suppliers. During the 1980s, most of the 
inputs, such as glass bottles, aluminium cans, polyethylene terephthalate bottles, were 
imported because the locally produced ones failed to meet the standard established by 
Coca-Cola. With technical assistance from Coca-Cola, a number of Chinese suppliers are 
able to produce the quality products demanded by Coca-Cola. Since the mid-1990s, more 
than 98 per cent of the supplies were sourced in the local Chinese market (AWSJ, 5 
March 1996: 3; PU-TS-USC, 2000: 22-23).  
For the market expansion in China, Coca-Cola’s strategy was to ensure that the 
company was not excessively involved in production and distribution. A cost-effective 
way to reduce risk and to overcome the problem of shortage of human resources was to 
manipulate the business functions indirectly through a franchise arrangement with 
foreign partners.13 As such, Coca-Cola teamed up with two foreign bottlers, namely 
Malaysia’s Kerry Group and Hong Kong’s Swire Group. The Swire Group mainly 
produces and distributes Coca-Cola products in southern and central China, while the 
Kerry Group focuses on northern and interior China. These foreign partners were able to 
bring in capital and human resources. The Coca-Cola bottling business was undertaken in 
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the form of a JV between Coca-Cola and its local partners.14 The involvement of the 
Kerry Group and the Swire Group was in the form of a franchise agreement with Coca-
Cola. This arrangement has shaped the basic features of the third stage of Coca-Cola’s 
business development in China (Field survey, 1999). Together, Coca-Cola’s franchising 
arrangements with foreign partners (i.e., the Kerry and Swire Groups) and its JVs with 
Chinese partners constitute the main elements of the company’s internalization strategy. 
Franchising is a method of producing and/or marketing goods and services in 
which the franchiser customarily grants the franchisee the right, or privilege, to operate 
the business in a prescribed manner over a period limited by the term of the franchise 
agreement. A large element of the franchise represents the market alternative to the 
internalized transfer of managerial and marketing skills (Buckley and Casson, 1985: 45-
49). In the case of Coca-Cola in China, the transfer includes manufacturing technology 
(Field survey, 2000). Mendelsohn and Bynoe (1995: 7) noted that “the investment in and 
ownership by the franchisee of the franchised business is a key feature (of franchising) 
since the franchisee is committed by his investment and expected, as owner, to be better 
motivated than would be a manager. Although there are references to the business being 
owned by the franchisee, there are two factors that make that ownership different from 
that enjoyed by a non-franchised businessman. The franchisee must operate under the 
franchiser’s name, using his system and within the terms of the franchise agreement.” 
They added that the ability of a franchised business to achieve growth is by linking the 
franchiser with his franchisees, who possess the capital and manpower to operate the 
business. This type of agreement fundamentally addresses the shortages of capital and 
human resources faced by Coca-Cola in its strategy of expanding market share in China. 
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The above mode of investment by a hybrid of JVs and franchising could 
potentially bring in revenue-enhancing, cost-reducing and risk-avoiding benefits to Coca-
Cola. Coca-Cola possesses rent-yielding assets, viz. the technology of producing Coca-
Cola and marketing expertise. Its local partners have the advantages of strong distribution 
arms and knowledge of local beverage markets (the nation-specific knowledge mentioned 
by Beamish (1988: 106)). The Kerry and Swire Groups are rich in cash, share the goal of 
long-term profit and market share maximization of Coca-Cola, and have strong political 
connections to the Chinese Government. The synergistic effect of combining the assets of 
various parties appeared to achieve the objective of maximization of Coca-Cola’s 
beverage market share in China. For instance, Coca-Cola was able to capture a market 
share of 40 per cent in 2000, almost three times that of Peps-Cola, its close international 
competitor (Table 3). These revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing potentials in JVs 
outweighed the advantages of WOSs. One way to guarantee these benefits was to make 
sure that the Kerry and Swire Groups obtained management rights in overseeing the 
bottling plants and assuming direct control of distribution via the acquisition of majority 
shares in the JV bottling business in China. The Kerry Group has in fact obtained about 
50-60 per cent equity shares of all its bottling plants, while the Swire Group was able to 
keep a controlling block of shares at 51 per cent in the bottling plants under its 
management control (Field survey, 1999 and 2000).15 
It has been argued that ownership is often used to control residual rights in 
international operations. An MNC’s ownership share in its foreign operation reflects the 
importance of the assets used in its operation and more importantly the bargaining power 
relative to its local partners (Nakamura and Xie, 1998: 571-99). Coca-Cola started to 
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negotiate with the Chinese Government in the early 1990s to buy-out the majority shares 
of all existing and newly planned bottling plants. The negotiation process was lengthy 
and difficult. The local partners were demanding high prices for the buy-outs, based on 
unreasonably high levels of projected future earnings.16 How to resolve the problem often 
relates to the art of ‘give and take’. The prime wish of the Chinese Government was for 
Coca-Cola to transfer its asset-specific knowledge and equipment in beverage production 
to its local partners to develop local branded beverages (SCMP, 27 January 1994: 14). 
This arrangement could be worked out in the form of a JV. For example, through the set-
up of a new 50-50 JV in Tianjin with China’s Ministry of Light Industries, Tianjin Jinmei 
Beverage Co. Ltd., Coca-Cola has been helping its local partners in Tianjin to develop 
some local branded drinks, e.g. Xingmu (“Smart”) soft drinks, TianYuDi (“Heaven and 
Earth”) fruit juice drinks, tea and bottled mineral water (Wang, 1998). 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF COCA-COLA’S CHOICE OF ENTRY MODE 
A review of Coca-Cola’s business development in China during the first two stages of its 
market entry (1979-1992) highlights four major challenges to the company’s long-term 
development strategy: 
• Initially, the Chinese market was highly fragmented, and the wholesale and 
distributional systems were outdated. This was further complicated because Coca-
Cola was the de facto wholesaler of concentrate, and did not have access to the 
operation of the bottling plants. To add to this problem, the company’s local market 
agents were fully responsible for production and distribution during the initial stages 
of market entry. 
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• Coca-Cola’s local partners played a passive role in the company’s market entry. 
Market agents acted out of self-interest and were opportunistic in running the bottling 
business. They had neither a strong incentive to acquire market share nor a long-term 
development strategy. 
• The Chinese government exerted tight control over the development of the soft drink 
industry and was careful to nurture domestic brands. Coca-Cola was not permitted to 
enter into a JV bottling business with its local partners until 1985, and even then it 
was restricted to a minority stake. 
• The local partners were too poor to finance further business expansion. As they were 
partially owned by local governments or various ministries, the major investment 
decisions that were made by the JV partners had to gain official approval. These 
experiences explain why Coca-Cola’s market share increased but slightly before the 
early 1990s. 
The first two challenges can be regarded as the high transaction costs that were 
incurred through uncertainty in the market environment and the opportunistic 
behaviour of market agents. The following two challenges were consequences of 
bounded rationality. Coca-Cola might have had limited knowledge about the 
paternalistic attitude of the Chinese Government in nurturing indigenous soft drink 
makers. It was certainly difficult for Coca-Cola to fully appreciate the financial 
difficulties that were faced by some of its local partners in expanding business operations. 
These challenges were further intensified by opportunism and uncertainty in the market 
environment. To reduce the impact of these constraints, a change in Coca-Cola’s 
operations was required. 
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To overcome the above challenges, Coca-Cola internalized market transactions 
through a strategy of long-term investment and, with the approval of the Ministry of 
Light Industry, was able to co-ordinate this with an increased control of production and 
domestic distribution. In the highly competitive market share driven business of 
carbonated soft drinks, to assume control of production and distribution is strategically 
essential. This meant that the acquisition of majority stakes in the bottling plants is 
almost a prerequisite for gaining the control over management. However, gaining this 
control was costly. To reduce the high risk of direct investment, Coca-Cola teamed up 
with two foreign bottlers under a franchise agreement. The synergistic effect of pooling 
the resources of Coca-Cola, its local partners and its foreign bottlers was high, and it 
delivered revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing benefits. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper applies the internalization theory to explain the entry mode choice of Coca-
Cola in China since 1979. The findings not only have implications for the applicability of 
the internalization theory, but also provide an insight into the market expansion strategy 
of a global soft drink manufacturer in China. To examine the change in Coca-Cola’s 
mode of market entry from franchises to JVs, and then to the current combination of 
franchises and JVs, we have employed internalization theory to address the issue of how 
and to what extent shifts in various investment modes can reduce the effects of market 
imperfections. Furthermore, the empirical data that we have presented suggest that 
adjustments in Coca-Cola’s modes of investment have contributed to a steady growth in 
market share and a high degree of market penetration in China. 
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This paper complements the existing literature on Coca-Cola’s business in China, 
e.g. Nolan (1995) and PU-TU-USC (2000), and argues that internalization theory is a 
useful conceptual framework for the analysis of its modes of investment in China. 
However, the application of any theoretical approach to firm-level study may be affected 
by deviations at the sectoral level, and by government policies. Moreover, national 
culture at the macro-level is also influential. Hence, any generalizations that are drawn 
from the present study of Coca-Cola’s experiences in China must be treated with care. 
Further studies should focus on local perspectives, in particular those of Coca-Cola’s 
Chinese JV partners and franchisees. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the editors and anonymous reviewers 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. They also thank those who 
facilitated the field surveys that were conducted by the principal author in 1999 and 2000. 
This paper could not have been completed without the financial support of the Hong 
Kong Polytechnic University (Research Grant A/C no. HZJ61).  
 
NOTES 
1.  Coca-Cola soft drinks first appeared on the Chinese market in 1923. The first bottling plant 
was built in Shanghai in 1927. Soon afterwards, Coca-Cola was bottled in other cities, 
including Tianjin in 1927 and Qingdao in 1930. The company left China after the socialist 
regime came to power in 1949 (Wang, 1998: 36). 
2.  Each of the two interviews in Beijing lasted for approximately one and a half hours. The 
interview in Tianjin lasted for almost two hours, and was followed by a working lunch for 
another one and a half hours. 
3.  Similar research methods have been used by many academics. Among others, see Yeung 
(2001: 8-12). Besides, in the context of the global economy, Nolan (2001) presents detailed 
case studies of the interaction between China’s big enterprises system and the global 
business revolution.  
4.  There are two major types of JVs, viz. equity joint ventures (EJVs) and contractual joint 
ventures (CJVs). The former is characterized by a long-term relationship among the partners 
that manage the JV. The latter, in contrast, has the basic feature that the partnership will 
dissolve after a specified period (Yeung, 2001: 3-6). 
5.  The three different stages were suggested by the interviewees (Field survey, 1999, see 
Sections [I] and [II] in Appendix A for further details).  
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6.  The interviewees were reluctant to disclose Coca-Cola’s sales value in China, which was 
regarded as a commercial secret. 
7.  The Chinese Government exerted tight control over the development of the soft drink 
industry to nurture domestic brands (Field survey, 2000; Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), 
15 February 1994: 1). 
8.  Literally, ‘yichan dingxiao’ means that the output level (rather than the market demand) 
determines sales and distribution (Yu, 1991: 380). In a report on the branding revolution in 
China, Schlevogt (2000) explains the evolving behaviour of Chinese managers in production 
and marketing, as well as their attitudes towards branding, from the central planning era to 
the current competitive period. He shows that during the central planning era, production 
depended on resource availability but not on market demand. 
9.  Quite often, producers were not concerned about product quality because they were not 
responsible for marketing. Consequently, products went unsold and had to be stockpiled in 
warehouses. This was a common production problem in the pre-reform era in China. See 
Dong, 1987:52-53.  
10.  However, Coca-Cola was restricted to minority stakes in the plants. 
11.  In the late 1970s, the Indian Government requested Coca-Cola to publicize the ingredients of 
its concentrate. The company preferred to abandon the market rather than comply 
(Economist, 15 July 1989: 67). 
12.  For example, when the Chinese government selected one local enterprise to form a JV with 
Pepsi-Cola, it was found to be bankrupt (Business China, 19 February 1996: 2). 
13.  Approval from the former Ministry of Light Industry and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission to build an additional ten bottling plants in 1993 made it necessary for Coca-
Cola to expand its operations in a more cost-effective manner (PU-TU-USC, 2000: 16). 
14.  Coca-Cola has been very selective in choosing its Chinese JV partners. Partners have been 
confined to the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, the China National 
Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporations and affiliates of the former 
Ministry of Light Industry (PU-TU-USC, 2000: 19-21). 
15.  For example, in Xiamen, the bottling plant was 51 per cent owned by the Swire Group. A 
local partner, Xiamen Luquan Industrial General Company, held the remaining 49 per cent. 
The plant had an annual production capacity of 30 million unit cases (AWSJ, 11 May 1998: 
4). 
16.  The Deputy General Manager of the Tianjin bottling plant was quite assertive on this point. 
However, he was not willing to release information on monetary figures in the bargaining 
process. He informed us that Coca-Cola promised to help its local partners to develop local 
branded beverages, among other terms, to arrive at an agreement for the Coca-Cola buy-out 
of the majority of shares of all existing and planned bottling plants (Field survey, 2000).  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS POSED DURING THE THREE INTERVIEWS TO 
COCA-COLA COMPANY IN CHINA, 1999-2000 
 
[I] First Interview in China 
Date of Interview: 18 November 1999 
Time: 9:30 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.  
Place: Department of Operations, Coca-Cola’s head office in Beijing 
Interviewee: General Manager of Operations 
 
(A) General background, history, and figures 
 
(1) How many subsidiaries do you have in China in 1999? Can you give me a breakdown 
by nature of ownership/relationship? Among these, what are the involvement of Kerry 
Group and Swire Group? 
 
(2) Please tell me about the changes in the number of Coca-Cola subsidiaries, in 
particular the number of joint ventures during the period after Coca-Cola has re-entered 
China. (e.g. early 1980s, mid-1980s, early 1990s, and mid-1990s). 
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(3) What is the total number of employees in Coca-Cola China Ltd? How many of them 
are managerial staff? Among them, how many are Chinese nationals recruited from the 
local market in China? How many are expatriates from overseas, including US/HK etc.? 
 
 
(B) Strategy of expansion and changes in business environment in China: 
 
(4) Coke has bought the majority equity of bottling plants and distribution channel in 
mid-1990s. Why has the strategy of Coke changed in such a direction? Was this change 
attributed to the behaviour of hold-up and opportunism of Coke's partners in China when 
Coke wanted to expand its market in China during that period?  
 
(5) In relation to point (4), we have an initial suspicion. Whilst equity joint ventures 
(EJVs) were an important mode (and absolutely necessary by host-country law) for Coke 
to re-enter the Chinese market in early 1980s, was the costs of doing so might be too high 
to Coke.  
 
 
(C) Uncertainty and specific advantages in the execution of contracts / business operation 
 
(6) On the issue of uncertainty in the business environment in China, over the period of 
the last two decades, did Coke suffer/benefit from changes in China’s policy regarding 
foreign direct investment as far as carbonated soft drinks sector is concerned? 
 
(7) In terms of asset specificity endowed in the Coke’s product, what were the bargaining 
chips of Coke in the negotiation processes with its partners in China? 
 
(8) What sort of “specific” advantages did the Chinese partners have? “Specific” 
advantages mean those advantages that were not easily provided by other firms in China. 
It being so, what were the bargaining chips of Chinese partners in the negotiation 
processes with Coke? Did those bargaining chips bring in some favourable terms to the 
Chinese partners? 
 
(9) On the issue of small number of agents in the operation of bottling plants in China, 
did Coke face difficulties in writing, executing and enforcing complex contracts with the 
Chinese partners? Any examples of damages/add extra costs to Coke? 
 
(D) Technology transfer 
 
(10) Is there any government requirement for technology transfer? How do you cope with 
this requirement? 
 
(11) Have you identified any damage/risk caused by your previous Chinese partners (in 
terms of trade secrets, technology, etc.)? 
 
(E) Coke’s investment in China, and other issues 
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(12) What are the main incentives for local partners to collaborate with Coca-Cola? 
 
(13) After weighing over all sorts of benefits and costs to Coke’s investment in China, do 
you see the collaboration with local partners in the form of joint ventures an advantage or 
a risk to the company? In what aspects? 
 
[II] Second Interview in China 
Date of Interview: 19 November 1999 
Time: 10:00 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.  
Place: Department of Marketing, Coca-Cola’s head office in Beijing 
Interviewee: Director of Marketing 
 
(A) General background, history and figures 
 
(1) Please provide me with the figures of market shares and sales volume (in bottles) of 
Coke in the last three years in China. (and Pepsi as well, if available) 
 
(2) Coke has been bottled in 13 sites in China in 1994. It has majority equity in all 16 
bottling plants in 1996. In 1998 and 1999, how many bottling plants does Coke have?  
 Among them, how many are state-owned plants?  
 Why to allow state-owned plants to produce bottled Coke?  
 What are the other forms of co-operation with Chinese partners?  




(B) Marketing: Coke and its competitors  
 
(3) What are the major factors contributing to the success of Coke in terms of its 
marketing strategy? Can we say that Coke’s achievement reflects its status of success as 
marketer and a franchiser, but not as a manufacturer or a distributor? 
 
(4) Before 1996, the distribution was handled by state-owned third party wholesalers. 
They were criticised being invariably passive. Why? Opportunism? Incentives? 
 
(5) In 1996, Coke adopted a hybrid distribution system consisting of direct distribution & 
third party wholesalers. Why Coke adopts the hybrid distribution system? Is it due to cost 
reducing or else? Any hold-up behaviour of third party wholesalers? 
 
 
(6) In relation to point (5), implementing direct distribution requires direct management 
controls. Was gaining this control expensive? How long was the period of calculating the 
projected future earnings? How much did this increase Coke’s costs to acquire the buy-
out? Do you think this is a hold-up/opportunistic behaviour? 
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(7) Distributing goods in China appears to be an expensive business. The privatisation of 
logistic businesses in China brings in competition, which may bring prices down. How 
true is it?  
 
(8) In relation to points (3) & (5), what are the roles of Robert Kuok’s Kerry Group & 
Swire Group? 
 
(9) Pepsi is lagging behind Coke in the Chinese market. This is partly due to the fact that 
Coke has successfully explored the ‘first-mover advantage’. Are there other reasons? 
 
(10) What kind of competition do you have from the domestic soft drink manufacturers? 
 
 
(C) Joint venture and other alternative arrangements  
 
(11) How important are the JV arrangements for Coke to initially get into the Chinese 
market? 
(12) Can you provide an overview on the Coke's operation in China since 1979 with 
particular reference to their joint venture (JV) arrangements 
 
(D) Regulations and guanxi in China 
 
(13) What is your experience in dealing with policymakers and regulators in China? Is 
the bureaucratic process less efficient that that of many other developing countries? 
 
(14) How important is guanxi to the successful operation of Coke in the Chinese market? 
 
(15) What are the ‘grey areas’ (semi-legitimate areas) in Chinese regulations and 
government policy regarding foreign investment in the soft drinks industry? Do these 
‘grey areas’ add costs or provide opportunities for Coke? 
 
[III] Third Interview in China 
Date of Interview: 29 March 2000 
Time: 10:15 a.m. – 12:00 noon  
Place: Coca-Cola’s bottling plant in Tianjin 
Interviewee: Deputy General Manager, Coca-Cola’s bottling plant in Tianjin. 
 
Questions asked in the interview: We did not fax questions to the Deputy General 
Managers before the visit. The principal author conducted the interview in a semi-
structured mode. Questions were selected from the above list.  
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TABLE 1 
MODES AND STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
(1979 – OCTOBER 2001) 
 













213,780 55.59 1,717.64 44.64 
Co-operative 
Joint Ventures 
51,046 13.27 761.69 19.79 
Joint R&D 
Ventures 
180 0.05 70.78 1.84 
Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiaries 
119,589 31.09 1,297.73 33.73 
Total 384,595 100 3,847.84 100 
 
Source: Adapted from MOFTEC (2002). 
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TABLE 2 
NUMBERS OF COCA-COLA’S BOTTLING PLANTS IN CHINA, 1982-2000 
 










Note: The numbers of Coca-Cola bottling plants in China do not correspond directly to 
Table 4 because some JV bottling plants have been re-named since Coca-Cola bought the 
majority shares. 
Sources:  
a: Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), 31 May 1996: 12. 
b: AWSJ, 26 November 1999: 11. 
Others: Field survey, 1999 and 2000. 
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TABLE 3 
MARKET SHARES OF COCA-COLA AND PEPSI-COLA IN CHINA 
(PER CENT) 
 
Year Coca-Cola Pepsi-Cola 
1992 12a 5a 
1993 12b 7c 
1994 19d N.A. 
1995 23e N.A. 
1996 26f 9f 
1998 33g 11g 
2000 40h 15 h 
 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
 
Sources: 
a: AWSJ, 15 February 1994: 1. 
b: AWSJ, 27 Jan 1994: 1. 
c: South China Morning Post (SCMP), 27 January 1994: 14. 
d: SCMP, 22 July 1995: 3 
e: AWSJ, 31 May 1996: 12. 
f: SCMP, 3 March 1998: 4. 
g: China Daily, 19 September 1999: 7. 
h: Field survey, 2000. 
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TABLE 4 
LOCATION AND NAME OF COCA-COLA’S JOINT VENTURE BOTTLING 
PLANTS IN CHINA, 2000 
 
Location Name of the Joint Venture Bottling Plant Year of Start 
1. Beijing* Coca-Cola Beverages (Beijing) Ltd. 1981 & 1999 
2 Chengdu Coca-Cola Beverages (Chengdu) Ltd. 1995 
3 Dalian* Coca-Cola Beverages (Dalian) Ltd. 1987 & 1993 
4 Guangzhou* Taigu-Coca-Cola (Guangzhou) Ltd. 1983 & 1999 
5 Harbin Coca-Cola Beverages (Harbin) Ltd. 1996 
6 Haikou Coca-Cola Beverages (Hainan) Ltd. 1991 
7 Hangzhou Zhongcui Food (Hangzhou) Ltd. 1989 
8 Hefei Taigu-Coca-Cola Beverages (Hefei) Ltd 1996 
9 Kunming Coca-Cola Beverages (Kunming) Ltd. 1996 
10 Nanjing Zhongcui Food (Nanjing) Ltd. 1989 
11 Nanning Coca-Cola Beverages (Nanning) Ltd. 1994 
12 Qingdao Coca-Cola Beverages (Qingdao) Ltd. 1997 
13 Shanghai* Shenmei Food (Shanghai) Ltd. 1986 & 1998 
14 Shenyang Coca-Cola Beverages (Shenyang) Ltd. 1995 
15 Taiyuan Coca-Cola Beverages (Taiyuan) Ltd. 1994 
16 Tianjin Coca-Cola Beverages (Tianjin) Ltd. 1990 
17 Tianjin Jinmei Beverages (Tianjin) Ltd. 1987 
18 Wuhan Coca-Cola Beverages (Wuhan) Ltd. 1993 
19 Xian Zhongcui Food (Xian) Ltd. 1995 
20 Xiamen* Taigu-Coca-Cola Beverages (Xiamen) Ltd. 1984 & 1996 
21 Zhengzhou Taigu-Coca-Cola Beverages (Zhengzhou) Ltd. 1995 
22 Zhuhai Coca-Cola Beverages (Zhuhai) Ltd. 1985 
23 Dongguan Taigu Beverages (Dongguan) Ltd. 1997 
  
Note: * with two bottling plants 
Sources: Field survey, 1999 and 2000; PU-TU-USC, 2000:17-18; Wang, 1998: 36. 
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FIGURE 1 
THE OPERATIONAL MODE OF COCA-COLA BUSINESS IN SHANGHAI 








 Shanghai Bottling Plant Co.*  Coca-Cola Concentrate Plant Co.** 
Shanghai Shenmei Beverage Co. Ltd.  
 
Notes: 
* This was wholly-owned by a state-owned enterprise. Coca-Cola had no involvement in
production, distribution, or profit-division of the company. 
** This was (and still is) wholly-owned by Coca-Cola. 
Source: Field survey, 1999 and 2000.   
